Turmoil in international politics in mid-February has definitely eclipsed Saint Valentine’s Day. While this was not unexpected, the new U.S. president spoke for 90 minutes with his Russian counterpart and warmly praised him afterward. The fact that this conversation happened around Saint Valentine’s Day suggests hope. Trump and Putin may not engage in a political bromance, but an old adage comes to mind: “Who is the mightiest of the mighty? The one who can turn an enemy into a friend.”
This telephone call should not have been earth-shattering. After all, the leaders of the two greatest nuclear powers must remain in contact. However, Trump’s call to Putin marked a significant departure from years of demonization of Russia and its leader, a trend that intensified three years ago following Russia’s military action in Ukraine.
Most Western leaders viewed the Ukrainian conflict as “unprovoked brutal aggression,” a compulsory cliché in mainstream media, which later evolved into the equally obligatory “full-scale invasion.” Trump rejected this depiction and, following his new Director of National Intelligence and several others in his administration, repeatedly pointed to the root causes of the conflict, chief among them the specter of NATO expansion into Ukraine. His Secretary of
Defense went even further, stating during a trip to Europe that this possibility was unrealistic—just as unrealistic as the notion of restoring Ukraine’s pre-war borders. Trump added that the Russians had fought hard for these territories.
This alone would have been enough to shock European allies. But American officials went even further. The United States announced that it would not send troops to guarantee any future peace agreement, and if European countries wished to deploy their military forces to offer guarantees to Ukraine, they would do so alone. The U.S. would not agree to activate Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which mandates a collective response if a NATO member comes under attack.
Then came the speech by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference. He argued that Europe faces “threats from within” rather than from Russia or China. He listed disdain for democracy, such as the ostracization of Alternative für Deutschland, Germany’s second-largest party. Vance also decried groupthink and intolerance in European media and political circles, mentioning the annulment of elections in Romania after a right-wing nationalist was poised to win the second round. His tone was stern and direct, and his words were met with almost complete silence from Europe’s politicians, experts, and bureaucrats, who had long lost the habit of hearing alternative viewpoints.
To be precise, those viewpoints were not so much their own as they were echoes of the previous U.S. administration’s stance, which sought to weaken Russia and even strategically defeat it. Some of Europe’s more intrepid powers, such as the Baltic states, even advocated for the dismemberment of Russia. Accustomed to obeying “the Master’s voice,” they continued following the old line, even though the Master had changed his tune. Moreover, during major
reforms of federal agencies, it was revealed (or rather, confirmed) that USAID had served as a conduit for the CIA in fomenting color revolutions and regime changes in dozens of countries, including the 2014 overthrow of Ukraine’s president. This provided documentary proof of a U.S.-orchestrated coup in 2014, which installed a virulently anti-Russian leadership in Ukraine—another factor leading to the conflict. These revelations were not framed as a mea culpa but rather as an indictment of the Democrats.
What must have struck the Europeans gathered in Munich was the absence of moralizing in the new American approach to the Ukraine conflict. There were no mentions of the struggle between Good and Evil, no claims of defending Ukrainian democracy, and no slurs or invective toward Russia and its president—all of which have become hallmarks of European and, until recently, American “diplomacy.”
This triggered a flurry of reactions from Europe’s ruling circles, almost all expressing defiance and indignation. “This is an existential moment, and it’s a moment where Europe has to stand up,” Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock told the audience. Several panels at the Munich Conference provided European leaders with a platform to speak. Without admitting that Russian forces were winning the war, they doubled down on promises to support Ukraine “for as long as it takes,” increase defense budgets, and stand up to Russia. All of this was predicated on the often voiced paradigm that Russia intends to restore the Soviet Union/Russian Empire and occupy much—if not all—of the rest of Europe.
This paradigm is part of the groupthink that Vance criticized in his speech. There have been no attempts to subject this assumption to rational analysis or reconcile it with empirical evidence from three years of warfare or with statements from Russian political leaders. While it was clear that the new U.S. administration no longer subscribe to this view of Russia, European elites continue to invoke the Russian threat. The meeting of European leaders, urgently convened in the wake of the Munich conference, did not include those – such as Hungary and Slovakia – who do not subscribe to this paradigm. It is no wonder the Europeans are not invited to the U.S.-Russia negotiations. Their anger and frustration are palpable.
Several European leaders invoked the infamous Munich Agreement of 1938, which enabled Hitler’s aggression. They proclaimed, “No more Munich,” warning against appeasing Russia. But the lesson is not so straightforward. The 1938 agreement handed Czechoslovakia to Hitler after Britain and France failed to form a collective security pact with the Soviet Union. Then-Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov remarked that “only the USSR has clean hands.” Moreover, London and Paris were directing Nazi Germany’s territorial ambitions eastward toward the Soviet Union.
Another reference to Munich is Putin’s speech at the same security conference in 2007, where he advocated for a collective security framework and criticized NATO’s eastward expansion, which he argued provided security for some countries at the expense of others. His plea fell on deaf ears, as did his proposals in late 2021 and early 2022.
Reactions from the Kremlin to the events of mid-February have been positive but restrained. There was little triumphalism on Russian TV current affairs programs, which featured a variety of opinions. Some acknowledged that Trump was a realist who recognized the tragic mistake of provoking this war. Others noted the intellectual inertia of the Europeans and debated Europe’s chances of reversing the war’s course without U.S. support. A few voices argued that Europe, despite its weakened state, still had the economic potential to continue arming Ukraine. There was broad agreement that Washington now favors realism over ideology and that this shift presents an opportunity to establish a new security framework in Europe.
Moscow had attempted to prevent the war by proposing new security arrangements in December 2021 and January 2022. These attempts were dismissed by Washington, leading to tragic losses for both Ukrainians and Russians. Recognizing that the war has strengthened rather than weakened Russia, these issues will be central to future negotiations, which should encompass a broad spectrum of U.S.-Russian relations.
It is therefore unsurprising that neither Ukrainian nor European leaders are involved in the early-stage talks between the two superpowers. Moreover, the memory of their deliberate and later avowed sabotage of the Minsk Accords, which were offering a peaceful solution of the Ukrainian problem, is still fresh. Both express disappointment and resentment, further reinforcing their marginalization.
Europe now stands at a crossroads: will it abandon ideological rigidity and self-righteousness to reclaim influence, or will it persist on the path initiated by the previous U.S. administration—one that Washington has since abandoned? If Europe chooses the latter, it risks becoming politically and economically relegated to the periphery of Eurasia. After centuries of power and glory, this would spell the loss of influence and, ultimately, irrelevance.
Source: https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/europe-irrelevance-rabkin/
