How would you describe Russia’s soft power, in the context of heightening geopolitical situation, with Africa?
Dr. Uliana Z. Artamonova: First of all, I would like to clarify that I prefer the term “public diplomacy” while addressing the policies aimed at establishing and maintaining the communication with foreign audiences. In my opinion, “soft power” is a bit outdated term, which was introduced by J. Nye in 1990s as a conceptual framework for American public diplomacy at the particular period of time: after the end of bipolar era. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, was introduced by E. Gullion in 1960s as a specific term to cover all the activities aimed at communication with foreign audiences and influencing their opinions, winning “the hearts and minds” (e.g., cultural exchanges, educational initiatives, international broadcasting, etc.). I believe during the past 5 years we have witnessed the intensification of Russia’s cooperation with Africa in general, including the efforts related to public diplomacy.
Main forms of Russian public diplomacy or soft power in Africa are humanitarian aid, the establishment of cultural centers and the organization of events popularizing Russian culture, the promotion of Russian language and Russian higher education, the development of scientific and educational cooperation. Russian governmental agency responsible for public diplomacy (The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation or Rossotrudnichestvo) under the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, coordinates all Russian cultural centers abroad. In Africa, so far, there are 9 such centers affiliated with Russian government – Russian centers of science and culture – in Zambia, Morocco, Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Tunisia, Ethiopia, South Africa and two centers in Egypt. In 2020s, though Rossotrudnichestvo started to build a network of partnerships with NGOs that are ready to assume the role of the Russian cultural center abroad with less bureaucratic issues. Since 2021, there has been opened 20 such centers, 13 among them – in African countries: Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Niger (2 centers). Rossotrudnichestvo also negotiates such arrangements with Sudan and Angola.
In addition, during the past years, African youth has become more interested in learning Russian. For instance, according to the ambassador of Russia in Kenya in 2024 the amount of those interested in learning Russian in that country has increased by ten times. Several divisions of Russian language have been opened recently in Egyptian universities. Several actors are involved in the promotion of Russian language in Africa: there are 16 Russian schools under the jurisdiction of Russian embassies; there are also “Russian corners” in 8 African countries – small entities funded by the Russian foundation “Russian World” (whose mission is to promote Russian language worldwide) that are usually hosted by local universities. “Russian corners”, which are accessible to anyone willing, are equipped with textbooks, audio-visual materials and other tools required for learning foreign language.
Another important track of Russian public diplomacy in Africa is the promotion of the Russian higher education. This particular form of soft power has been connecting the societies of Russia and African countries since the middle of 20th century. There are several Associations of Russian universities’ alumni in Africa. About 27 thousand of students from Africa are currently enrolled in Russian universities, more than 5 thousand among them were granted the scholarship by the Russian government (their tuition fees are covered by the Russian federal budget), and the amount of such scholarships has been increasing since 2022.
Another important part of Russian public diplomacy in Africa is the international broadcasting of Russian media. After 2022, Russian international broadcasting was essentially blocked in the West because of the lack of desire of most Western governments to allow their citizens to listen to an alternative point of view concerning global politics and conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Since then, Russian media outlets have pivoted their attention to other regions, including Africa. Russian media outlets have widened their coverage in African during the past years: for example, radio “Sputnik” is FM-broadcasted in Niger, Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Botswana and Cameroon. Sputnik has also launched a French-language platform called Sputnik Afrique in July 2022. Channel “RT-Arabic” (part of the RT-network – Russian international video broadcaster) opened a regional bureau in Algeria in 2023. RT is also available in many African countries: Maghreb, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire and others. In addition, in 2024, the RT Academy international educational project of the RT global TV news network was launched, initially focused on journalists from ASEAN and South Asian countries. However, during the same year, the first media course for journalists from Africa, available in both English and French, was launched as well. Participants will gain insight into the full news production process, learn how to present effectively on-camera, engage audiences on social media and produce high-quality video content. This initiative is supported by the Rossotrudnichestvo and regional media platforms. Such a project has a potential to strengthen the ties between the relevant professional communities in Russia and African countries, as well as to develop the common information space. “We are proposing a common Russian and African information space in which objective, unbiased information about world events will be broadcast to Russian and African audiences,” President Vladimir Putin said in a speech at the 2023 Russia-Africa summit in Saint Petersburg.
It is worth mentioning that in the 20th century the USSR and the Non-Aligned Movement have already tried to reform the international information space claiming it was dominated by media outlets of the Western/former colonial powers, who according to those claims have exploited such dominance to maintain their influence in the developing countries within the framework of neo-colonialism. One might argue that some of those issues remain with the domination of narratives promoted by Western media in the international information space and the efforts of Western countries to block alternative voices while exploiting, for instance, their supremacy in communication technologies (e.g., satellites).
But that is arguably incomparable to the United States and Western countries in Africa?
UZA: The scale of spending on public diplomacy efforts is probably incomparable. The U.S. government spends millions of dollars on its public diplomacy, whereas the Russian budget for such activities is quite modest. In addition, I believe not only Africa but almost all of the world is quite dependent on the American telecommunication technologies (including broadcasting and internet infrastructure as well as hardware and software in general), which provides the American public diplomacy with the obvious advantage over other states in terms of projecting ideas and influencing public opinions worldwide.
Do you suggest Russia borrow one page from China, whose influence has significantly increased during the past decade in Africa?
UZA: Russian and Chinese approaches to soft power or public diplomacy in general or in Africa in particular are quite similar, both emphasizing education and culture. What makes the difference is the scale: The Chinese government provides almost ten times more scholarships for African students than the Russian government does. There are 61 Confucius Institutes in 46 African countries compared to 29 Russian cultural centers in 20 African countries. One may argue that the influence of China has significantly increased during the past decade in Africa not due to public diplomacy activities, but due to investment and trade. Many infrastructural projects in Africa are being either sponsored by China or implemented by Chinese contractors. On that note I do not think that Russia should pay less attention to soft power efforts in Africa in favor of focusing rather in trade and investment. I believe that Russia has quite a unique mental and cultural connection to the communities in African countries that, in the long run, might prove to be more valuable than any partnership based on the mutual economic or financial interest. That solid foundation for the relationship-building comes from the 20th century, when the USSR was one of the most passionate supporters of anticolonialism. Since Russia has never been a colonial power in its history, but has been a rival to the states that used to be colonial powers and opposed both colonialism and neo-colonialism, the image of Russia in the public opinion in African countries is rather positive and backed up by generation-old positive perceptions in people’s minds.
Do you also ascribe to the fact that Russia’s soft power has become ‘softer’ than during the Soviet times? Would you finally agree that Soviet Union was more engaging than Russia with Africa?
UZA: I do believe that Russian public diplomacy has been built from scratch after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, public diplomacy institutes in the USSR were interconnected with other governmental structures, which in turn had a communist ideology deeply integrated within their every function. Since modern Russia in 1991 has abandoned communist ideology as the official state ideology, most governmental institutions were not modernized accordingly, but were swept from existence into oblivion. The same fate befell the Soviet system of public diplomacy. So, Russia has only started developing the system of public diplomacy institutes, methods, and instruments in the 2000s. Of course, compared to the public diplomacy of the Soviet Union, Russian public diplomacy still lags in many aspects: scale, coordination, and consistency. That also applies to the relevant experience in African countries.
Is there any room for improvement? What do you suggest should be done to stimulate policy in the continent of Africa?
UZA: There is always room for improvement when public diplomacy is concerned. It deals with human beings, and we are constantly evolving; thus, public diplomacy needs to adapt quickly to new trends. In terms of Russian soft power in Africa, I think it would be mutually beneficial to increase the number of Russian cultural centers and “Russian corners” promoting the Russian language there, at least to match the number of Chinese Confucius Institutes. The same can be said about the number of scholarships offered by the Russian government to African students. In addition, the idea introduced by RT of Russian companies offering specific education to African professionals may be further spread to other industries, in which Russia has expertise worth sharing, and which might in the future become a fruitful field for cooperation between Russia and African countries. It is also important to focus to only on the quantity of public diplomacy projects but their quality as well. In particular, educational, cultural, and information initiatives should all highlight the shared values between Russia and African countries, their common cause in countering neo-colonialism, but also those initiatives should focus on teaching Russian and African communities about each other, their respective traditions, history, and cultures.
